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UNCONSCIONABILITY WARS
David Horton*
INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the unconscionability
doctrine to federal arbitration law. In the last three decades, as the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1 arbitration clauses have become a routine part of consumer, franchise, and employment contracts. Some companies have sought not just to funnel cases
away from courts, but to tilt the scales of justice in their favor: stripping
remedies, slashing discovery, selecting biased arbitrators, eliminating the
right to bring a class action, and saddling adherents with prohibitive costs
and fees.2 The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as the primary
check on drafter overreaching. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that lower courts can invoke unconscionability to invalidate one-sided arbitration provisions,3 and dozens (perhaps hundreds) of judges have done exactly that.4
Recently, however, a rising chorus of voices argues that the FAA allows arbitrators, but not judges, to strike down arbitration clauses as unconscionable.5 These critics make three main points. First, they argue that
the FAA, which limits judicial discretion, is incompatible with unconscionability, which is one of the most subjective and amorphous rules in all of
law.6 Second, they assert that Congress recognized that the statute might allow powerful drafters to exploit weaker parties, but nevertheless concluded
that its benefits outweighed these risks.7 Third, they seize upon a seeming
discrepancy at the heart of the statute. Section 2‘s ―savings clause‖ permits
*
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1
Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)) (link).
2
For specific examples, see David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 460
(2011) (link).
3
See, e.g., Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (link).
4
See, e.g., David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 658 (2010) (link).
5
See, e.g., Petitioner‘s Reply Brief at 12–16, Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772,
(2010) (No. 09-497) (link); Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2067 (2011) (link).
6
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 5, at 2050 (―[T]he whole point of the FAA is to take arbitration
provisions out of the doghouse by removing judicial discretion when it comes to their enforcement.‖).
7
See, e.g., id. at 2051.
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courts to invalidate arbitration clauses under ―such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract‖8—a phrase that arguably encompasses all contract defenses, including unconscionability. Yet § 4 only
allows judges to hear challenges to the ―making of the agreement for arbitration.‖9 Unconscionability revolves, in part, around substantive fairness,
not the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause. Thus, the claim proceeds, because unconscionability does not fall within § 4, judges cannot employ the
rule.10 I will call this group of arguments the ―anti-court‖ theory.
The anti-court theory took on a new dimension in April 2011, when the
U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the
FAA preempts a California Supreme Court rule that had rendered most
class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable.11 The logic
in Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion—that the California law is inconsistent
with the ―purposes and objectives‖ of the FAA—earned the support of only
three other Justices. Although Justice Thomas ―reluctantly‖ joined the majority opinion, he wrote separately to explain that he believes § 4 restricts
§ 2‘s ―savings clause‖ to defenses that relate to the ―making‖ of the arbitration provision.12 In other words, Justice Thomas adopts one of the anticourt theory‘s premises, but arrives at a different, more drastic conclusion:
whereas the anti-court theory posits that judges cannot apply unconscionability to arbitration clauses, Justice Thomas implies that nobody can apply
unconscionability to arbitration clauses.13 I will call this the ―antiunconscionability‖ theory. Because Justice Thomas provided the swing
vote in Concepcion, and invited parties to address the link between §§ 2 and
4 in the future,14 he ensured that unconscionability‘s viability will become a
flashpoint in the arbitration wars.
This Essay challenges the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories. First, it argues that the anti-court theory is impossible to square with
the FAA. The statute‘s core provision, § 2, only validates arbitration clauses if they do not violate ―grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.‖15
As the Court has acknowledged, unconscionability is one such ground.16
8

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (link).
Id. § 4 (link).
10
Petitioner‘s Reply Brief, supra note 5, at 13 (―Treating unconscionability as relevant to whether
an arbitration agreement has been ‗made‘ is . . . inconsistent with the text of Section 4 . . . .‖).
11
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (link).
12
See id. at 1753–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (link).
13
See infra Part III.C (explaining why I read Justice Thomas‘s opinion to suggest that the modern
unconscionability doctrine is not a proper defense to an arbitration clause).
14
See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that this issue ―could benefit from briefing and argument in an appropriate case‖). In fact, pro-business litigants and amici had already been pushing this theory hard. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in
Support of Petitioner at 31 n.7, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (link); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 14–15, Cellco P‘ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2010) (No. 10-398), 2010 WL 3700269,
at *15.
15
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
16
See, e.g., Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996).
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Section 2 thus predicates arbitration on the existence of an arbitration clause
that is not unconscionable. The anti-court theory does not comply with this
sensible mandate because it requires judges to compel arbitration even
when faced with a flagrantly unconscionable (and thus unenforceable) arbitration clause.
Second, this Essay debunks the idea, common to both the anti-court
and anti-unconscionability theories, that § 4 restricts § 2‘s defenses to those
that relate to the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause. Focusing exclusively
on the statute‘s text, as Justice Thomas purports to do, actually demonstrates that § 2 preserves all contract doctrines that can be grounds for the
rescission of an agreement. Although § 2 excludes one variation of unconscionability, a rule I call ―equitable‖ unconscionability, it embraces the modern unconscionability doctrine that courts actually apply to arbitration
clauses. Thus, the statute neither strips judges of the power to apply unconscionability nor excludes unconscionability completely.
I. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Today, most courts and scholars think of unconscionability as a single,
monolithic doctrine. In this Part, I show that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unconscionability actually consisted of several discrete
principles. Then, I describe how the passage of the FAA made the precise
contours of unconscionability one of the most important and contentious issues in federal arbitration law.
A. Pre-FAA Unconscionability
Before the twentieth century, most judges described contracts as ―unconscionable‖ if they were too one-sided to specifically enforce. As the
Michigan Supreme Court succinctly put it: ―Specific performance is a remedy of grace, rather than right, and will be refused where it is inequitable
to grant it.‖17 Even a modest degree of unfairness could trigger this manifestation of the rule. For example, one court denied specific performance of a
deal to sell a tract of land for $14,000 because its fair market value was
$15,000.18 I will call this ―equitable‖ unconscionability.
Judges also used another variation of unconscionability to limit the
damages available in an action at law. This version of the rule required a
stronger showing of injustice than equitable unconscionability. For example, in Hume v. United States, the federal government argued that a contract
calling for it to purchase shucks for thirty-five times their market price was
unconscionable.19 The Supreme Court agreed, and awarded the seller nothing more than the reasonable value of the shucks.20 As the Court explained,
17
18
19
20

Rathbone v. Groh, 100 N.W. 588, 591 (Mich. 1904) (internal citations omitted).
See Wilson v. White, 119 P. 895, 900 (Cal. 1911).
132 U.S. 406, 414 (1889) (link).
Id. at 415.
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the agreement was ―fraudulent‖ because it was ―such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.‖21 Because judges in these cases held that the consideration was so imbalanced that fraud was ―intrinsic‖
to the exchange, I will refer to it as the ―intrinsic fraud‖ rule.
Finally, courts employed a third version of unconscionability to nullify
entire contracts. These cases featured two elements. First, because of a
flaw in the contracting process—―imbecility,‖ intoxication, old age, or a
language barrier—one party could not fully understand the bargain.22 This
component distinguished the rule from intrinsic fraud, which was available
even to sophisticated parties with bargaining power.23 Second, this manifestation of unconscionability required the terms of the agreement to be harsh
or ―improvident.‖24 Although the opinions are inconsistent, the degree of
unfairness sufficient to rescind a contract generally exceeded that required
for equitable unconscionability, but was less than that necessary for intrinsic fraud.25 As with intrinsic fraud, though, the basis of the rule was that
one party had not given her authentic, autonomous assent to the transaction.26 I will describe this doctrine as ―rescission‖ unconscionability.
Before the twentieth century, courts did not apply the unconscionability doctrine in any of its incarnations to arbitration clauses. But as I describe
next, two major developments—the enactment of the FAA and the rise of
standard form contracts—would pit arbitration and unconscionability
against each other.
B. The FAA
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA.27 The statute sought to override
the deep-seated suspicion of arbitration that American courts had inherited
along with the common law.28 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
English courts had invented unique rules to prevent litigants from settling
disputes outside of the judicial system. Under the ouster doctrine, they invalidated arbitration clauses as improper attempts to override their jurisdic-

21
22

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Harris v. Wamsley, 41 Iowa 671, 673 (1875); Miller v. Howard, 184 P. 773, 775 (Okla.

1919).
23

For example, as noted above, Hume applied the intrinsic fraud rule even though the party invoking the rule was the federal government, which enjoys ample bargaining muscle. See Hume, 132 U.S. at
414–15.
24
Harris, 41 Iowa at 673.
25
See, e.g., Bride v. Reeves, 40 App. D.C. 473, 478–79 (1913).
26
See, e.g., Barnes v. Waterman, 104 N.Y.S. 685, 687–88 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (annuity contracts were
unconscionable because one party did not ―fully and clearly understand the[ir] terms‖).
27
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
28
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (explaining that the
FAA‘s ―purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts‖) (link).
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tion.29 And under the rule of revocability, courts allowed parties to retract
their consent to arbitrate until the very moment that the arbitrator rendered
an award.30 The FAA abolished these anti-arbitration measures. Section 2,
the statute‘s ―centerpiece,‖31 instructs courts that they can only use traditional contract principles—not the ouster or revocability doctrines—to nullify a contract to arbitrate:
A written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.32
Yet the FAA did not cut judges out of the loop completely. If a dispute
arises about the ―making of the agreement for arbitration,‖ § 4 tasks courts
(or juries) with resolving it.33 For reasons that will become apparent, I will
quote § 4 in detail later.
C. Modern Unconscionability
Decades after the FAA‘s enactment, courts and scholars struggled to
assimilate the standard form (or ―adhesion contract‖) into contract law.
These non-negotiated, unilaterally-drafted documents reduced transaction
costs.34 At the same time, though, they threatened to undermine the very
definition of a ―contract.‖ Although binding agreements supposedly arose
from words or conduct that each party could reasonably construe as assent
to the exchange, drafters knew that few (if any) adherents would read the
boilerplate. As a result, standard forms—particularly self-serving provisions in standard forms—did not seem to meet the minimum standards for
contract formation.35
Courts and policymakers responded, in part, by revamping the unconscionability doctrine. In the mid-1960s, building on the foundation laid by
―rescission‖ unconscionability, they created an unconscionability rule tailored to standard forms. This doctrine, which I will call ―modern‖ unconscionability, consists of the two-pronged test that prevails in most

29

See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) 532 (―[T]he agreement of the parties
cannot oust this Court . . . .‖).
30
See, e.g., Vynior‘s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.) (holding that parties could withdraw
their consent to arbitrate at any time before the arbitrator ruled).
31
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (link).
32
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
33
Id. § 4 (link).
34
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 115 (6th ed. 2003).
35
See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–71
(1960).
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jurisdictions today.36 Procedural unconscionability hinges on the circumstances surrounding contract formation, such as whether a provision was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or buried in fine print.37 Substantive
unconscionability arises when a term is ―overly-harsh‖ or ―one-sided.‖38 By
allowing courts to invalidate terms that suffer from these defects, modern
unconscionability penalizes drafters for overreaching and maintains judicial
integrity.39 But more importantly, it isolates terms to which adherents do
not assent in any meaningful way. As the D.C. Circuit explained in the watershed case of Williams v. Walker–Thomas Furniture Co.: ―[W]hen a party
of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent,
was ever given to all the terms.‖40 Indeed, modern unconscionability empowers courts to strike down provisions that ―fall outside the ‗circle of assent‘ which constitutes the actual agreement.‖41
When the Court expanded the scope of the FAA in the mid-1980s, it
transformed modern unconscionability into the most important—and controversial—doctrine in federal arbitration law. Responding to the Court‘s
pro-arbitration jurisprudence, companies of all sizes placed arbitration
clauses in their standard form contracts.42 Often these provisions not only
required the parties to bypass the judicial system, but also created an alternative procedural regime that favored the drafter.43 Courts annulled so
many of these clauses that modern unconscionability became defined largely by its role in the arbitration context.44 In turn, this entanglement with arbitration created a new problem. On the one hand, the overwhelming
consensus among judges and commentators—reinforced by dicta in several
Court opinions—was that unconscionability was a ―‗ground[] . . . for the
revocation of any contract‘‖ and thus could serve as a defense to an arbitra-

36

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2010–2011) (recognizing modern unconscionability) (link); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541
(1967) (tracing the drafting history of the U.C.C.‘s unconscionability provision and criticizing the rule
for its ―definitional void‖).
37
See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675,
1694–95 (2009) (collecting cases) (link).
38
A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982) (link).
39
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 2043.
40
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (link).
41
A & M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
42
See, e.g., Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pitfalls for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994,
at L37 (noting the pervasiveness of arbitration clauses).
43
See, e.g., Horton, supra note 2, at 460.
44
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability
as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 622 (2009) (noting the sharp rise in unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses in the last decade); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 804–08 (2004) (collecting cases that illuminate the
―renewed unconscionability-based scrutiny of arbitration clauses‖).
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tion clause under § 2.45 On the other hand, unconscionability was so tied to
arbitration that it seemed less like a traditional contract defense and more
like a specialized anti-arbitration measure. Scholars began to protest that
courts were manifesting a ―new judicial hostility to arbitration‖ by applying
a stricter version of unconscionability to arbitration clauses.46 In fact, Concepcion was the culmination of a long struggle by corporate defendants to
get the Court to review a lower court‘s unconscionability ruling that allegedly discriminated against arbitration.47
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are the latest embodiment of this pushback. I critique both in the next two Parts.
II. THE ANTI-COURT THEORY: ARBITRATION WITHOUT A VALID
ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Under the anti-court theory, arbitrators can apply unconscionability,
but judges cannot. Before I address this thesis on its own terms, I will highlight a reason why it cannot be correct: it would force courts to compel arbitration before determining that a valid arbitration clause exists.
The Court often declares that arbitration is ―a matter of contract.‖48
Section 2 enshrines this principle by making a binding arbitration clause—
one that is not susceptible to ―grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract‖49—the price of admission to arbitration. However, the anti-court
theory would send disputes to arbitration without insisting that the drafter
lay this foundation. For instance, Stephen Friedman, who endorses the anticourt theory in a brilliant article, argues that even judges faced with a flagrantly unconscionable arbitration clause ―must grit their teeth‖50 and compel arbitration. But that would allow arbitration to conjure itself out of thin
air. If an arbitration clause is blatantly unconscionable, it is unenforceable
under § 2, and there is no basis for arbitration.
There are two seeming exceptions to this principle, but neither go as
far as the anti-court theory. First, the FAA requires courts to honor
―invalid‖ arbitration clauses because it preempts traditional contract law.
For instance, the Court has interpreted the statute to eradicate certain
strands of the longstanding contract defense of violation of public policy.51
45
See, e.g., Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2);
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (link).
46
Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 470–71, 486.
47
Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution
of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1466–68 (2008) (anticipating Concepcion by noting the rise in petitions for certiorari that asked the Court to rule that a lower ―court is using unconscionability against arbitration clauses in ways it is not used in other contexts‖) (link).
48
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (link).
49
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
50
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2067.
51
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that by holding that the FAA preempts the right of states to deem certain contracts void for violation of
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As a result, a court cannot strike down an arbitration clause just because a
state has a strong interest in guaranteeing a judicial forum for certain
claims. This may or may not be normatively desirable, but it flows naturally from the fact that the FAA preempts any state law that obstructs its goals.
Critically, however, neither judges nor arbitrators can apply the public policy defense in this manner. It is not a viable defense to an arbitration clause.
Conversely, the anti-court theory candidly acknowledges that unconscionability is a permissible defense to an arbitration clause. Indeed, even under
the anti-court theory, unconscionability is a non-preempted
―ground[] . . . for the revocation of any contract‖ under § 2. Thus, when a
court enforces an unconscionable arbitration clause, it does not merely
uphold a term that would be invalid under quotidian contract law—it
upholds a term that is invalid under the FAA itself. The anti-court theory
cannot be squared with the statute it seeks to interpret.
Second, although the FAA allows arbitrators to decide gateway issues
about the arbitration itself, it does not permit a judge to enforce an arbitration clause that triggers a non-preempted ―ground[] . . . for revocation of
any contract.‖ For instance, arbitrators can determine whether a particular
dispute falls within the scope of the clause. However, that is not the same
as whether the arbitration clause is valid under § 2. Similarly, under the separability doctrine, courts must treat any contract that contains an arbitration clause as two contracts: (1) the overarching agreement that includes the
arbitration clause (the ―container contract‖) and (2) the contract to arbitrate.52 The separability doctrine permits arbitrators to resolve allegations
that the container contract is unenforceable.53 But when a party specifically
challenges the arbitration clause, a court decides the issue.54 Thus, even
under the separability doctrine, arbitration cannot proceed unless a judge
has determined that the arbitration clause satisfies § 2.
Likewise, the Court‘s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson55 conditions arbitration on the existence of an arbitration clause that
a judge has vetted for the full range of non-preempted ―grounds . . . for revocation of any contract.‖ In Rent-A-Center, the Court extended the sepapublic policy, the Court has eradicated a ―‗ground[] . . . for the revocation of any contract‘‖ (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 2)) (link).
52
See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967) (compelling the
arbitration of a claim that one company fraudulently induced another company to enter into a consulting
agreement that included an arbitration clause) (link); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (―[A]s a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision
is severable from the remainder of the contract.‖) (link).
53
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402.
54
See, e.g., Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448–49. Admittedly, the contours of the separability doctrine are
hotly contested. Compare Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About ―Separability‖
in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 1, 14 (2003) (arguing courts are, in fact, able
to decide some claims that seek to invalidate the container contract), with Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 121–23
(2007) (claiming that the separability rule is too broad and should be repealed) (link). I am referring to
the doctrine as the Court seems to understand it in cases like Buckeye.
55
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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rability rule to so-called ―delegation clauses,‖ which expressly authorize the
arbitrator to decide the very issue of whether the arbitration clause is enforceable.56 The Court held that if a contract contains a delegation clause,
judges cannot decide whether the arbitration clause is valid unless a party
first overturns the delegation clause.57 But the Court reached this conclusion by conceptualizing delegation clauses as stand-alone, mini-arbitration
clauses within arbitration clauses within container contracts: ―an agreement
to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.‖58 In other words, even if a contract contains a delegation clause, a case does not
proceed directly to arbitration. Rather, a court must decide whether the delegation clause is valid under § 2.59 Again, under no circumstances can drafters do what the anti-court theory would permit them to do: completely endrun the judiciary by creating self-enforcing agreements to arbitrate.
Finally, the anti-court theory would have perverse results. It would
give arbitrators the exclusive right to decide whether an arbitration clause is
unconscionable even when the unfair features of the clause make it harder
to prove that the arbitration clause is unconscionable. Suppose the drafter
reserves the right to select the arbitrator. As the Fourth Circuit declared,
such an arrangement ―ensure[s] a biased decisionmaker.‖60 However, without a prophylactic layer of court involvement, the biased decisionmaker
would preside over the claim in which she is biased. Of course, the law tolerates self-interested adjudication when a judge must decide whether to recuse herself, but judges are never unilaterally appointed by one party. And
unlike arbitrators, their rulings (both on recusal motions and the merits) are
subject to the full panoply of appellate review. Thus, by allowing arbitrators complete dominion over their own neutrality, the anti-court theory encourages abuse. Similarly, if drafters impose exorbitant arbitral costs or
choose an inconvenient forum, the only way for consumers, franchisees, or
employees to obtain a ruling that these provisions are unconscionable
would be to endure the exact injustices—paying excessive fees or travelling
far away—that made the provisions unconscionable.
For these reasons, Congress did not exempt arbitration clauses from
unconscionability challenges in court. In the next Part, I examine the anticourt and anti-unconscionability theories in greater detail.
III. THE FLAWED FOUNDATION OF THE ANTI-COURT AND ANTIUNCONSCIONABILITY THEORIES
As I mentioned at the outset of this Essay, anti-court proponents make
three main arguments. They contend that courts cannot apply unconsciona56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 2777.
Id. at 2780–81.
Id. at 2777.
See id. at 2777–78.
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (link).
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bility to arbitration clauses because (1) unconscionability gives judges too
much discretion, (2) Congress passed the FAA even though it recognized
that stronger parties might foist arbitration on others, and (3) unconscionability does not relate to the ―making of the agreement to arbitrate‖ under
§ 4.
Although the anti-unconscionability theory is less developed, it maps
onto these assertions perfectly. Each argument drives a wedge between the
FAA and unconscionability, suggesting that unconscionability cannot be a
defense to an arbitration clause. Moreover, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence
in Concepcion holds that certain strands of unconscionability do not relate
to the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause.
A. Judicial Discretion
According to the anti-court camp, there is tension between the FAA,
which eliminates judicial discretion in several areas, and unconscionability,
which gives judges wide leeway to do what they wish. Indeed, the FAA
severely limits the grounds on which courts can vacate, modify, or overrule
an arbitrator‘s award.61 It also requires courts to stay litigation and compel
arbitration ―in accordance with the terms of the agreement‖ if a dispute falls
within the scope of a valid arbitration clause.62 Unconscionability, on the
other hand, revolves around ―fairness‖—an utterly subjective norm—and
allows courts to annul some aspects of the arbitration clause while upholding others. Moreover, the theory continues, Congress passed the FAA to
abolish the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration.63 Thus, it could not have
wanted courts to apply a doctrine that could easily camouflage the same antagonism toward extrajudicial dispute resolution.
Yet this argument sweeps too broadly. Unconscionability is not the
only fact-sensitive, pliable rule that courts use to strike down arbitration
clauses (or portions of arbitration clauses). Consider the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Judges have relied on the implied covenant
to nullify one-sided arbitral procedures64 and drafters‘ attempts to unilaterally add arbitration clauses to existing contracts.65 However, good faith—a
―chameleon‖ which lacks ―a settled meaning‖—is just as nebulous as unconscionability,66 and no court, scholar, or litigant of whom I am aware has
argued that it is off limits to judges in the arbitration arena. Similarly,
courts routinely decide that a party has waived its right to arbitrate, even
though this issue involves a flexible, multi-factored balancing test.67 Even
61

9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006) (link).
Id. at §§ 3, 4 (link).
63
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 2051.
64
See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
65
See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Ct. App. 1998) (link).
66
Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333, 1339 (7th Cir. 1988) (link).
67
See, e.g., Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., No. 4851, 2011 WL 2792385, at *8 (S.C. Ct. App. July 13, 2011) (―There is no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate; the question
62
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the duress defense, which indisputably falls under § 2, is ―amorphous‖68 and
hinges on easily-manipulated factors such as whether a threat is ―improper.‖69
Thus, many rules aggrandize courts and yet remain capable of voiding
arbitration clauses. Unless Congress meant to create a nasty recurring linedrawing problem, the mere fact that a doctrine confers broad discretion on
judges does not mean that it is unavailable to them.
B. Contractual Overreaching
Anti-court theorists also claim that Congress was aware that the FAA
might allow stronger parties to impose arbitration on others, but ultimately
decided that its virtues trumped these shortcomings. These theorists focus
on two exchanges in the legislative history. First, Julius Henry Cohen, the
author of the FAA, testified that the revocability doctrine reflected the fact
that ―the stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts
had to come in and protect them.‖70 As anti-court proponents argue, because Congress passed the FAA after Cohen flagged these concerns, it must
have determined ―that simplicity and the desirability of enforcing arbitration provisions outweighed . . . protect[ing] vulnerable parties.‖71 Second,
Senator Sterling, the Subcommittee Chairman, quizzed Cohen about railroad contracts offered on a ―take it or leave it‖ basis.72 Cohen replied by
citing the governmental regulation of bills of lading and insurance contracts
as evidence that ―people are protected to-day [sic] as never before.‖73 However, the anti-court theorists state that ―[n]owhere in his answer does Cohen
indicate any role for courts in policing against overreaching contracts.‖74
Yet it is not surprising that Cohen never mentioned that judges might
protect adherents. In 1925, they lacked the means to do so. Policymakers
had not started thinking about standard forms as part of a systemic problem.
Indeed, it had been just six years since Edwin Patterson had introduced the
phrase ―contract of adhesion‖ to American legal commentary.75 As I have
argued above, the unconscionability doctrine was largely a way for courts
sitting in equity to refuse specific performance of one-sided contracts.
depends on the facts of each case.‖ (quoting Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (link).
68
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 920 n.4 (Utah 1993) (link).
69
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
70
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2050–51 (quoting Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th
Cong. 15 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)).
71
Id. at 2051.
72
See id. at 2051–52 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note70, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)).
73
Id. at 2052 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note 70, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)).
74
Id.
75
See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919).
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Modern unconscionability, which would have applied to the standard form
contracts that Cohen and Senator Sterling were discussing, did not emerge
until the mid-1960s.
Moreover, Congress never had to consider whether judges should protect weaker parties because the FAA as enacted was much narrower than it
is today. Congress arguably passed the statute under its Commerce Clause
power.76 In 1925, however, Congress could not regulate intrastate transactions.77 Thus, the FAA would have applied only to the rare adhesion contract that was negotiated across state lines. Alternatively, some judges and
scholars believe that the FAA actually flowed from Congress‘s Article III
authority to regulate federal courts.78 As a result, the statute would have only governed in diversity cases, where the parties were citizens of different
states and the amount in controversy exceeded $3,00079—criteria that would
have excluded most consumer, employment, and insurance agreements.
Accordingly, Congress never faced the stark choice that the anti-court camp
attributes to it between arbitration hegemony and protecting the rights of
adherents.
Thus, the most plausible explanation for any silence in the record about
the role of courts is not that Congress intended to strip them of their ability
to act as a bulwark against powerful drafters. Rather, it is that Congress assumed that the FAA applied largely to merchant-to-merchant transactions
and thus did not create a serious risk of exploitation.
C. The ―Making‖ of the Arbitration Clause
Finally, both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories claim
that unconscionability does not fall within § 4. When a party moves to
compel arbitration, § 4 states that:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. . . . If the making of the arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to
the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party
alleged to be in default, . . . the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party
alleged to be in default may . . . demand a jury trial of such
issue . . . . If the jury find that no agreement in writing for
76
See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 106 (2002).
77
See id. at 127–28.
78
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 28 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (link).
79
See Drahozal, supra note 76, at 157 (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 267 (1926)).
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arbitration was made . . . , the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration
was made in writing . . . , the court shall make an order
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.80
Thus, on its face, § 4 seems only to permit courts to resolve disputes
about the ―making of the agreement for arbitration.‖
This passage is key to the anti-court theory. For instance, Professor
Friedman argues that unconscionability does not relate to the ―making‖ of
the arbitration clause. Instead, as he sees it, ―the contract has been made
and we need to decide what to do with it.‖81 Accordingly, he concludes that
§ 4 does not permit courts to entertain unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses. Rather, courts must order cases to arbitration and permit the
arbitrator to decide what to do with the potentially unconscionable provision.82
Likewise, the phrase ―making of the agreement for arbitration‖ is central to the anti-unconscionability theory as set out in Justice Thomas‘s concurrence in Concepcion. The seeds of Concepcion were sown in 2005,
when the California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts could be unconscionable when applied to numerous low-value claims.83 The state high
court reasoned because plaintiffs will not prosecute such claims on an individual basis, class arbitration waivers amount to ―‗get out of jail free‘
card[s]‖ for corporate liability.84 However, Concepcion held that the FAA
preempts Discover Bank.85 The four-Justice majority reasoned that class
arbitration is slower and more formal than bilateral arbitration.86 Thus, the
majority held that California‘s attempt to guarantee such procedures for
low-value claimants through the unconscionability doctrine ―stand[s] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA‘s objectives.‖87
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, a staunch textualist, has foresworn the
freewheeling ―purposes[-]and[-]objectives‖ preemption that the majority
deployed.88 As a result, he ―reluctantly‖ concurred and wrote separately to
explain how he reached the same result by applying the statute‘s plain

80

9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2060.
82
Id.
83
113 P.3d 1100, 1108–10 (Cal. 2005) (link).
84
Id. at 1008 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
86
Id. at 1751.
87
Id.
88
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (link).
81
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meaning.89 First, he noted that § 2 makes arbitration clauses ―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,‖ but only makes them vulnerable to
―grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.‖90 This asymmetry led him
to conclude that § 2 does not apply to ―all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses.‖91 To determine which defenses fit the bill, he looked to § 4:
When a party seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement in
federal court, § 4 requires that ―upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to
comply therewith is not in issue,‖ the court must order arbitration ―in accordance with the terms of the agreement.‖92
Reading §§ 2 and 4 harmoniously, the ―grounds . . . for the revocation‖
preserved in § 2 would mean grounds related to the making of the agreement.93
Although Discover Bank claimed to apply the unconscionability doctrine, Justice Thomas found that it actually furthered California‘s interest in
using the class action to deter corporate wrongdoing.94 Because it centered
on these extrinsic policy considerations rather than the ―making‖ of the arbitration provision, it was preempted.
More broadly, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence implies that he does not
think that modern unconscionability is a defense to an arbitration clause.
For instance, he explains that §§ 2 and 4 require courts to enforce an arbitration clause ―unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the
formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual
mistake.‖95 Unconscionability is conspicuously absent from that list. Then,
in a footnote, he cites Hume v. United States for the proposition that unconscionability ―historically concern[s] the making of an agreement.‖96 As
noted, Hume involved the intrinsic fraud rule, a precursor to modern unconscionability. The fact that Justice Thomas interprets the FAA to allow
courts to utilize the intrinsic fraud rule does not necessarily mean that he
would extend that logic to modern unconscionability, which did not exist
when Congress passed the statute.
As I explain in the next subparts, I disagree with the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories‘ view of these issues for three reasons. First, I
am not convinced by Justice Thomas‘s conclusion that § 2 is ambiguous.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1754 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
Id. at 1754.
Id.
Id. at 1754–55 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1755 n.* (emphasis added).
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As a result, there is no reason to try to shoehorn § 4‘s reference to the
―making‖ of the arbitration clause into § 2. Second, I do not believe that
Congress intended the word ―making‖ to mean ―formation.‖ As I explain,
this narrow reading would have undesirable consequences in other contexts,
such as the separability doctrine. Third, even if §§ 4 or 2 do, in fact, only
encompass defenses that relate to contract formation, modern unconscionability satisfies this standard. Even the species of unconscionability that Justice Thomas found preempted in Concepcion preserves the role of mutual
assent in adhesion contracts and thus falls squarely within §§ 4 and 2.
1. The False Link Between §§ 2 and 4
Unlike the anti-court theory, which takes no position about the meaning of § 2, the anti-unconscionability theory‘s central premise is that § 2 is
ambiguous. Indeed, as Justice Thomas observes, § 2 is lopsided: it makes
arbitration clauses ―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ subject only to
grounds for ―the revocation of any contract.‖97 Thus, Justice Thomas looks
to § 4 ―[t]o clarify the meaning of § 2.‖98
However, with one caveat, I believe that § 2 is clear on its face. The
phrases on which Justice Thomas focuses do two things. First, they abolish
the ouster and revocability rules. They do this by making arbitration clauses ―valid‖ (overruling the ouster doctrine) and ―irrevocable‖ (eliminating
the revocability principle). Second, by making arbitration clauses ―enforceable,‖ they prohibit courts from denying specific performance. Indeed, one
of the FAA‘s major purposes was to require courts to automatically grant
specific performance as the remedy for breach of an arbitration clause.99
This need to make specific performance mandatory explains half of the
―ambiguity‖ that Justice Thomas identifies: the omission of the word ―nonenforcement.‖ Section 2 could not have stated that arbitration clauses are
―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable‖ subject to the grounds for the ―revocation and non-enforcement of any contract.‖ Doing so would have created a
loophole that would have permitted courts to continue to decline to specifically enforce arbitration clauses.
At this point, I want to acknowledge a corollary of my interpretation:
the FAA does not allow courts to apply the doctrine of equitable unconscionability. By immunizing arbitration clauses from traditional contract
rules that are ―grounds . . . for non-enforcement,‖ the statute eclipses any
rule, including equitable unconscionability, that entitles judges to deny specific performance. Thus, when Justice Thomas reasons that § 2 ―does not
include all defenses applicable to any contract but rather some subset of

97

Id. at 1754 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
Id. at 1754.
99
See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the FAA ―abrogate[d] the general common-law rule against specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements‖ (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
98
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those defenses,‖100 he is exactly right. However, because equitable unconscionability is only tenuously related to modern unconscionability, this conclusion makes little practical difference. More importantly, once the ―nonenforcement‖ puzzle is solved, § 2 contains only one true ambiguity: it does
not state that arbitration clauses are susceptible to grounds for contractual
―invalidity.‖
There are several plausible explanations for the absence of ―invalidity.‖ The most likely contender is that, as Justice Thomas acknowledges,
―invalidity‖ and ―revocation‖ mean the same thing.101 ―Invalid‖ means ―being without legal force.‖102 ―Revoke‖ means ―to void.‖103 Because there is
no difference between a contract that lacks legal force and one that is void,
a contract cannot be ―invalid‖ unless it is ―revocable,‖ and vice versa. In
fact, in the years leading up to the FAA‘s passage, courts often emphasized
that an agreement was binding by calling it ―valid and irrevocable.‖104
Congress could easily have determined that ―revocation‖ made ―invalidity‖
superfluous.
Another possibility stems from the FAA‘s drafting history. The first
glimmer of what would become § 2 can be found in a 1917 Illinois law that
provided that ―[a] submission to arbitration shall . . . be irrevocable.‖105 Although the statute only governed the arbitration of existing controversies
(not future disputes), it influenced Julius Henry Cohen, who reproduced it
verbatim in the appendix of his 1918 polemic Commercial Arbitration and
the Law.106 Cohen then borrowed the basic structure of the Illinois legislation when he drafted New York‘s landmark 1920 Arbitration Act, which
100

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. In fact, Justice Thomas lumps ―enforceability‖ into the same class as ―validity‖ and ―irrevocability.‖ Id. As noted above, I believe that grounds for ―non-enforcement‖ are narrower than grounds
for ―invalidity‖ and ―revocability.‖ A contract can be ―valid‖ and ―irrevocable‖ but not ―enforceable‖ if
a court refuses to specifically enforce it. Similarly, doctrines such as frustration or impracticability,
which excuse performance, are neither grounds for ―revocation‖ nor ―invalidity.‖
102
Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 932, 941 (Conn. 2010) (defining ―invalid‖ as ―[n]ot legally binding‖
(quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009))) (link); Gonzales-Blanco v. Clayton, 458 N.E.2d
1156, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (defining ―invalid‖ as ―being without legal force or effect‖ (quoting
WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1188 (1976))) (link); Sims v. Beckett, 15 Ohio
Dec. 734, 740 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1905) (―Webster‘s International Dictionary defines the term ‗invalid,‘ as
used in law, as of no force or effect or efficacy; void; null.‖).
103
In re Nantz, 627 S.E.2d 665, 670 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (―The American Heritage Dictionary defines ‗revoke‘ as ‗to void or annul by recalling, withdrawing, or reversing.‘‖ (quoting THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000))) (link); see also BLACK‘S LAW
DICTIONARY 1435 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―revocation‖ as ―[a]n annulment, cancellation, or reversal‖).
104
See, e.g., Harper v. Tipple, 184 P. 1005, 1007 (Ariz. 1919); English v. Bd. of Supervisors, 19
Cal. 172, 185 (1861); Bobzin v. Gould Balance Valve Co., 118 N.W. 40, 42 (Iowa 1908); Worthington
v. Rich, 26 A. 403, 404 (Md. 1893); Sch. Dist. of City of Kan. City v. Stocking, 40 S.W. 656, 659 (Mo.
1897); Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Voorhees, 91 N.Y.S. 816, 819 (App. Div. 1905); Schnuerle v. Gilbert,
180 N.W. 953, 954 (S.D. 1921); Waggoner Bank & Trust Co. v. Warren, 234 S.W. 387, 389 (Tex.
1921); Brundage v. Burke, 40 P. 343, 343 (Wash. 1895); Raesser v. Nat‘l Exch. Bank, 88 N.W. 618, 620
(Wis. 1902).
105
Act of June 11, 1917, ch. 10, § 3, 1917 Ill. Laws 202.
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JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 294–98 (1918).
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made arbitration clauses ―valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.‖107 Not only did ending the provision with ―revocation‖ mirror the Illinois law, but it made sense because the revocability doctrine was so firmly
established in New York that the legislature had seen fit to carve out a limited exception to it in New York‘s Code of Civil Procedure.108 It was thus
important to stress that the new Arbitration Act totally superseded the revocability principle. Cohen copied the New York statute‘s language in § 2 of
the FAA. Accordingly, the FAA‘s fixation on ―grounds for revocation‖
may simply be a historical accident.
However, Justice Thomas‘s solution to the omission of ―invalidity‖ in
§ 2—to import the phrase ―the making of the agreement for arbitration‖
from § 4—is not persuasive. To be sure, ―[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme.‖109 Yet there is no need to look outside the four corners of a statutory provision unless it is actually ambiguous: susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations that would produce different outcomes when applied
to the same facts.110 The fact that Congress did not use the word ―invalidity‖ in § 2 is not a real ambiguity. As noted above, ―revocation‖ and ―invalidity‖ are synonyms. Because § 2 already uses the term ―revocation,‖ it
would generate the same results in cases with or without the word ―invalidity.‖ Thus, Justice Thomas‘s justification for grafting language from § 4 into § 2 is dubious.
Moreover, even if § 2 is ambiguous, Justice Thomas‘s ―clarification‖
of it is a jarring non-sequitur. There is no analytical relationship between
the symptom (the omission of the word ―invalidity‖) and the cure (limiting
§ 2 to defenses that relate to contract formation). Because the statute uses
the term ―revocation,‖ and ―revoke‖ is ―to void,‖ § 2 includes all defenses
that can void a contract. This is true whether the defenses relate to contract
formation (like fraud) or not (like public policy). The absence of ―invalidity‖ does not suggest that Congress meant something narrower than ―revocation‖ when it used the word ―revocation.‖ By limiting the plain meaning of
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Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 72, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804 (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R.
7501 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2011)).
108
3 N.Y. CODE CIV. P. § 2383 (George Bliss & George A. Clement, eds., New York, Baker,
Voorhis & Co., 6th ed. 1912) (providing that parties could no longer revoke their consent to arbitrate
after the arbitration had progressed past a certain point), repealed by Act of Apr. 19, 1920, § 7, at 806
(―Sections twenty-three hundred and eighty-three, twenty-three hundred and eighty-four and twentythree hundred and eighty-five of chapter seventeen, title eight, of the code of civil procedure are hereby
repealed.‖).
109
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting United Sav. Ass‘n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988)).
110
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d
702, 710 (10th Cir. 2006) (―A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in two or more different senses.‖) (link).
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―revocation‖ in § 2 by inserting language from § 4, Justice Thomas does not
―clarify‖ the statute. Rather, he contradicts it.
In fact, the FAA‘s legislative history elucidates that Congress believed
that § 2 applied to all defenses—not just those that center on formation. For
instance, Senator Walsh expressed his understanding that ―[t]he court has
got to hear and determine whether there is an agreement of arbitration, . . . and it is open to all defenses, equitable and legal.‖111 Similarly, in
a law review article about the New York statute, Cohen wrote that it ―recognizes that the infirmities, common to all contracts, which furnish
grounds for revocation at law or in equity, may still exist in cases of arbitration agreements.‖112 To be sure, Cohen used the word ―revocation,‖ but, as
noted above, grounds for ―revocation‖ include both formation and nonformation-related defenses. And at the very least, if § 2 did, in fact, only
govern contract formation, there would have been some discussion of this
point in the congressional record. But there is none.
Accordingly, § 4 sheds no light on § 2. Of course, the fact that
―grounds for revocation‖ includes all contract defenses (other than those
that would be ―grounds for non-enforcement‖) does not mean that judges
can freely apply these rules. For instance, no court could invalidate an arbitration clause because it believes that waiving the right to a jury trial violates public policy. But contrary to Justice Thomas, that result does not
stem from the language of § 2. Instead, it arises from the doctrine of ―purposes[-]and[-]objectives‖ preemption and the muscular pro-arbitration policy that the Court created out of whole cloth. To be serious about textualism
is to acknowledge that the statute only preempts a sliver of traditional contract doctrine.
2. ―Making‖
Both the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories also claim that
Congress used the phrase ―the making of the agreement for arbitration‖ in
§ 4 to mean the ―formation‖ of the arbitration clause. For instance, Professor Friedman argues that ―[u]nconscionability does not really go to the issue
of whether a contract was made.‖113 And as noted above, Justice Thomas
concludes that ―[c]ontract defenses unrelated to the making of the agreement . . . could not be the basis for declining to enforce an arbitration
clause.‖114
However, these approaches rely too heavily on words that Congress
did not utilize with precision. For instance, § 4 requires a court to order arbitration if ―an agreement for arbitration was made in writing‖ but not if
111

Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 4213 and S. 4214, 67th
Cong. 5 (1923) (statement of Sen. Charles L. Bernheimer).
112
Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE
L.J. 147, 149 (1921).
113
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2060.
114
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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―no agreement in writing for arbitration was made.‖115 Similarly, a report
prepared by the House Committee on the Judiciary describes § 4 as offering
―a method for the summary trial of any claim that no arbitration agreement
ever was made.‖116 Read literally, these excerpts seem to require courts to
order arbitration if there is a piece of paper that purports to be an arbitration
clause. Indeed, an arbitration clause induced by egregious fraud has been
―made.‖ However, no one subscribes to this view. Thus, the fact that Congress used ―made‖ loosely militates against a hyper-literal reading of ―making.‖
Moreover, if ―making‖ meant only ―formation,‖ it would have bizarre
consequences outside the narrow context of unconscionability. Section 4
also provides the textual root of the separability doctrine. As the Court has
explained, judges cannot hear challenges to the container contract because
§ 4 only permits them to resolve ―issue[s] which go[] to the ‗making‘ of the
agreement to arbitrate.‖117 But if ―making‖ is ―formation,‖ then courts lack
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the arbitration clause that do not relate
to the contracting process. Paradoxically, these would be the very claims—
that the arbitration provision is illegal or violates some non-preempted
strand of the public policy defense—that Congress was least likely to entrust to arbitrators.
Finally, Professor Friedman buttresses his argument by noting that § 4
―is directed largely at safeguarding the right to trial by jury.‖118 Indeed, that
provision repeatedly mentions the role of the jury in deciding whether to
compel arbitration. Because juries do not hear unconscionability challenges, Professor Friedman concludes that § 4 does not permit courts to invoke the rule.119
Nevertheless, § 4 does not vest in juries the exclusive right to determine whether an arbitration clause was ―made.‖ To the contrary, it entrusts
the court with ―hear[ing] and determin[ing]‖ that issue ―[i]f no jury trial be
demanded by the party alleged to be in default.‖120 Moreover, there is a
simple explanation for § 4‘s preoccupation with jury trials. As noted, Cohen modeled the FAA on New York‘s arbitration law. Section 3 of the
New York statute, which served as the blueprint for § 4 of the FAA, declared that if a party demanded a jury trial about the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause, the judge should submit the matter ―to a jury in the manner
provided by law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action.‖121 By
115

9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
GEORGE S. GRAHAM, TO VALIDATE CERTAIN AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, H.R. REP. NO.
96, at 2 (1924).
117
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967).
118
Friedman, supra note 5, at 2059.
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doing so, it preserved an important feature of New York‘s Code of Civil
Procedure: the ability of parties to request a jury trial for equitable defenses.122 Eliminating this entitlement would have raised a serious constitutional problem.123 So, the New York statute (in a paragraph the FAA copied
wholesale took pains to give juries an active role in challenges to the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause. Thus, the fact that § 4 refers repeatedly to
jury trials is a holdover from the New York statute, not evidence of Congress‘s intent to foreclose courts from entertaining equitable defenses such
as unconscionability.
3. Modern Unconscionability and Formation
Finally, suppose that the anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories
are correct that only defenses that hinge on the ―making‖ of the arbitration
clause fall within § 4 (or § 2). As I have argued above, modern unconscionability does, in fact, revolve around contract formation. Indeed, modern
unconscionability reflects the fact that ―gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may
confirm . . . that the weaker party . . . did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.‖124 Under their own logic, then, the anti-court and
anti-unconscionability theories do not remove unconscionability from the
judicial arsenal.
This conclusion is true even for the very application of the unconscionability doctrine that Justice Thomas found to be preempted in Concepcion.
Citing a passage in Discover Bank in which the California Supreme Court
explained that class arbitration waivers can reduce the drafter‘s liability,
Justice Thomas reasons that ―[e]xculpatory contracts are a paradigmatic example of contracts that will not be enforced because of public policy.‖125
He thus concludes that the state high court‘s holding does not revolve
around the ―making‖ of the arbitration clause. But there is a second, wellestablished reason that courts strike down exculpatory clauses in adhesion
contracts: because they are ―wanting in the element of voluntary assent.‖126
Indeed, in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, a case that served as
the springboard for Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court noted that
when a liability waiver appears in an adhesion contract, ―the releasing party
122

See, e.g., Bernard E. Gegan, Is There a Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial of Equitable Defenses in New York?, 74 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2000) (noting that New York courts allowed defendants to try equitable defenses to juries if the plaintiff sought relief at law).
123
See id. at 1–3.
124
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981); see also id. § 211 cmt. c (noting
that because customers only ―assent[] to a few terms,‖ standard forms are subject to ―the power of the
court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term‖). Justice Thomas may not disagree with
this general sentiment. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 249 (1995) (plurality opinion)
(O‘Connor, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―[A] determination that a
contract is ‗unconscionable‘ may in fact be a determination that one party did not intend to agree to the
terms of the contract.‖) (link).
125
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring).
126
The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268 (1902) (link).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/17/

32

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting of the
risk.‖127 Thus, if Discover Bank had simply pointed out that consumers are
unlikely to notice, understand, or agree to class arbitration waivers, Justice
Thomas could not have found it to be preempted. At most, then, the anticourt and anti-unconscionability theories will change the rhetoric that
judges employ, rather than the results they reach.
CONCLUSION
The anti-court and anti-unconscionability theories are not convincing
interpretations of the FAA. The anti-court theory would make unconscionable arbitration clauses self-enforcing—a result that is both illogical and
undesirable. The anti-unconscionability theory takes an unduly narrow
view of § 2. Courts should reject these attempts to eliminate their role as a
vital check on unfairness in arbitration.
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